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An important immigration policy question is to identify the best criteria to select among 
potential migrants. At least two methodological problems arise: the host country’s immigration 
policy regime endogeneity, and immigrants’ unobserved heterogeneity. To address the first 
problem, we focus in a country with an unprecedented immigration boom that lets immigrants 
freely into a country: Spain. To address the second problem, we focus on a large and 
homogenous group of immigrants: Moroccans. Using the 2007 Encuesta Nacional de 
Immigración (ENI), we find that, even when focusing on a very homogenous group of 
migrants (Moroccans) who tend to be low-skilled, and after controlling for migrants’ self-
selection with employment history prior to and at arrival, family-based immigrants are less 
likely to work than their labor-based counterparts both at arrival and ten years later. Our 
Heckman-corrected estimates highlight that there are no monthly earnings differences by 
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I.  Introduction 
 
An important immigration policy question is to identify the best criteria to select among 
potential migrants.  While some countries have given priority to family migration, 
others advocate a greater emphasis on labor market skills in the immigrant selection 
process.  In favor of prioritizing skill-based immigration is that it leads to higher quality 
and better employability of migrants (Borjas, 1985 and 1995; Bell, 1997; Green, 1999; 
Duvander, 2001; Cobb-Clark, 2000, 2003; Richardson et al., 2001, 2002; Chiswick and 
Miller, 2006; and Thapa and Gørgens, 2006, among others).  However, when trying to 
estimate the best immigrant selection process, lack of information on the type of visa an 
immigrant holds has made it difficult for researchers to assess the role of the selection 
criteria in the settlement and assimilation process of immigrants in the host country.  As 
a consequence, several research strategies have exploited dissimilarities in immigration 
between countries with similar labor markets (Chiswick, 1986; Borjas, 1992) or policy 
changes across time within a country (Green and Green 1995; and Green, 1995).  But 
these indirect approaches have yielded mixed and limited results at best (Cobb-Clark, 
2000).   
A reduced number of studies, with access to information on individual data on 
migrants’ entry status, have compared employment- and family-based immigrants’ 
settlement in the United States (Jasso and Rosenszweig, 1995; and Sorensen, et al., 
1992), Canada (Aydemir, 2011) and Australia (Williams et al, 1997; Miller, 1999; and 
Cobb-Clark, 2000).  A concern with those studies that compare immigrants with 
different types of visa in a country with a long tradition of receiving immigrants is that 
the country has a clear immigration policy regime in place, which is very likely to be 
endogenous to the country’s social, economic, and political situation, and at the same 
time affect the settlement process of the different types of immigrants it receives.  As a   3
consequence, the ideal “experiment” would be to let immigrants freely into a country 
and then compare the labor market performance of those who arrived for family reasons 
and those who arrived to work.  While there would still be an identification problem 
because of immigrants’ self-selection process, having a rich data set on individuals’ 
labor market characteristics before and after migration would enable the researcher to 
potentially address this unobserved heterogeneity problem.  This is the identification 
strategy that we follow in the present paper.   
The contribution of this paper is to use the 2007 Encuesta Nacional de 
Immigración (ENI) to analyze whether Moroccan immigrants who arrive on the basis of 
family relationships rather than labor market opportunities in Spain have better legal 
and employment status (including earnings) immediately after migration, and whether 
this represents a long-term advantage or disadvantage in the labor market.  The 
advantage of the ENI is that it contains rich and detailed information on the immigration 
process and the labor market involvement before and after arrival in the host country, 
enabling us to identify the reasons for migrating as well as reconstructing the 
employment history of immigrants from prior to departure from Morocco to arrival in 
Spain and (finally) to the survey date.  The analysis uses a bivariate probit model that 
jointly estimates legal and employment status, and OLS, and Heckman-corrected 
regressions when analyzing earnings.  Evidence of employment differences by reason of 
arrival implies that failure to account for these differences when estimating the earnings 
equation may bias the earnings results. 
Spain presents a unique immigration experience to analyze such issues as the 
country experienced an unprecedented immigration boom in a short period of time—
with immigrants increasing from 1% of the population in 1990 to 12% in 2009, and an 
average annual flow of immigrants of 500,000 per year.  At the same time, Spain has   4
been an immigrant-friendly country because of a lax implementation of immigration 
laws and several generous amnesties granting legal residence to illegal immigrants 
(Dolado and Vázquez, 2007; Izquierdo et al., 2009, among others).
1  The main reason to 
focus on Moroccans is that they represent a large (16.2% of all immigrants living in 
Spain in 2005) and homogenous group of immigrants (reducing our identification 
concerns raised earlier).  In contrast with Ecuadorians (the other large group of 
immigrants in Spain), Moroccans’ longstanding tradition of migrating towards Europe 
reduces potential endogeneities due to policy changes.
2  Finally, Morocco’s pioneering 
role within Southern Mediterranean countries in terms of its European Neighborhood 
Policy, makes its study of great policy relevance for Southern and Eastern 
Mediterranean countries. 
A priori it is not obvious whether family-based migrants will outperform in 
terms of legal or employment assimilation labor-based migrants.  On the one hand, 
those migrating for family-reasons may be less prone to work (as they may specialize in 
home production).  On the other, given that they arrive to the host country having at 
least a family member (who most likely is successful in its settlement), it may be easier 
for them to have access to (better) jobs or information on how to apply to (better) jobs.   
Similarly, it is unclear whether the family-based migrant will legalize her situation 
faster than the labor-migrant.  While it is true that those arriving due to family reasons 
may have already a family member with legal permit who will guide them through the 
legal process, or (even better) facilitate their access to legal status, those coming to 
work, may quickly enter the labor market, which is the most direct path towards being 
                                                 
1 An assumption here is that if people migrate to Spain to work, it is because there are jobs available.  In 
the case of Spain at the time under analysis, this assumption seems to hold. 
2 While the large inflow of Ecuadorians has taken place at the turn of century and is a direct consequence 
of the social, economic, fiscal, and monetary crisis Ecuador was experiencing at the time, the arrival of 
Moroccans (albeit also increasing) has a longer tradition of steady outflows of immigrants towards 
European countries (including Spain).   5
legalized (as when amnesties occur, having a supporting employer considerably 
simplifies and accelerates the process).  It is important to note that by having 
information on employment status before leaving Morocco and at arrival in Spain, we 
are able to potentially address an important individual self-selection problem, as we will 
compare family- versus work-based immigrants holding constant their employment 
history before and at arrival in the host country.  Finally, because the literature review 
shows that the Southern Mediterranean region displays unique gender characteristics 
such as patriarchy, high fertility, male-breadwinner model, and low rates of education 
and waged work outside the home for women (Omran and Roudi, 1993; Yasmeen, 
2004; McQuilan, 2004; Foroutan, 2008a,b,c; Foroutan, 2009), the analysis is 
disaggregated on the basis of gender.   
Our contribution to the literature is threefold.  First, we use a sample of legal and 
illegal immigrants (as opposed to only legal migrants, as is standard in the literature that 
uses visa information).  Moreover, instead of using information on visa status, we use 
migrants’ self-reported reason of arrival, namely arrival due to the presence of a family 
member or to work.  Second, we are able to jointly model the employment and legal 
status decision as they are both heavily intertwined.  Third, while most studies have 
limited information on observable characteristics, such as education, experience and 
language, our dataset also contains information on employment status prior to departure, 
as well as information on networks at arrival and at survey date in the host country.  We 
are thus able to explore their effect on legal and employment outcomes.   
We find that, even when focusing on a very homogenous group of migrants 
(Moroccans) who tend to be low-skilled, and after controlling for migrants’ self-
selection with employment history prior to and at arrival, family-based immigrants are 
less likely to work than their labor-based counterparts both at arrival and ten years later,   6
suggesting that family ties are not as helpful in terms of securing employment.  Our 
Heckman-corrected wage estimates indicate that no wage differences exist by reason of 
arrival, consistent with the fact that we are comparing a homogeneous group of migrant 
workers.  Our results highlight the importance of correcting for selection into 
employment for both males and females 
The paper is organized as follows.  The next section presents background 
information.  Section III describes the data and the descriptive statistics.  Section IV 
explains the methodological approach, and analyzes the results.  Section V concludes 
with a discussion on policy implications. 
 
II.  Background Information 
Moroccan Immigration 
Over the second half of the 20th century, Morocco has evolved into one of the world's 
leading emigration countries.  Since the early 1960s, this country has a longstanding 
tradition of sending migrants towards France, Belgium and the Netherlands.  However, 
legislation changes from the 1980s limiting migration in the traditional receiving 
countries in Europe led to a shift of Moroccan low–skilled (often irregular) migration 
towards Spain and Italy that has lasted until today.  As of 2007, according to the 
Spanish Labor department, as many as 648,735 Moroccans had a resident permit in 
Spain (representing over 16.3% of legal immigrants in this country).  In terms of the 
Moroccans living in Spain (regardless of their legal status), the Encuesta de la 
Población  estimates that in 2007 there were 706,666 Moroccans in the Spanish 
territory, representing 13.07% of all immigrants.  This group of migrants has been 
observed to be clustered at the end of the occupational spectrum and in low-skilled 
sectors, such as agriculture (30%), construction (27%), and services (36%), highlighting   7
their potential vulnerability and increasing their policy relevance both for economic and 
social reasons.   
Despite Morocco’s strong economic progress since 2001 (with growth rates 
averaging around 5%), the country still confronts formidable challenges common to 
other Southern and Eastern Mediterranean countries, such as the vulnerability to shocks 
(social, natural, and economic); inadequate social indicators relative to the country’s 
income level; high unemployment, especially among youth; increasing pressure on 
natural resources, especially water, which is exacerbated by climate change; large social 
and economic inequality, and lagging structural economic change.  Thus, understanding 
Moroccans’ settlement in a host country is insightful to other Southern European 
Mediterranean migrants.  Finally, in regional terms, Morocco has, since the 1990s, 
acquired a pivotal role in border management and control. This status has conferred a 
key position for Morocco in Euro-Mediterranean migration governance, while leading 
to significant controversies regarding Morocco’s regional role in the management of 
migration flows.  How this has played into Morocco’s migrants’ settlement process is 
also worth exploring. 
Spanish Assimilation Process 
Several authors have recently analyzed immigrants’ assimilation in Spain by looking at 
wages or immigrants’ labor market success, and distinguishing by continent of origin.  
Although (to the best of our knowledge) there is no work focusing on Moroccans, given 
that they represent an important share of African immigrants in Spain, it is worth 
highlighting earlier findings on the Spanish assimilation process of immigrants coming 
from this continent.     
The bottom line is that, although labor-market assimilation of immigrants takes 
place, convergence is far from occurring, with immigrants segregating into lower paid   8
occupations and more vulnerable jobs.  The situation for Africans is even worse as their 
assimilation is slow and they remain in a vulnerable economic situation.  Using 2001 
decennial Population Census data, Amuedo-Dorantes and de la Rica, 2007, study the 
occupational assimilation process of the immigrants who arrived in Spain between 1996 
and 2000, prior to the immigration boom.  While these authors find evidence that non-
EU15 and Latin American immigrants assimilate employment- and occupation-wise, 
there is limited evidence of labor market assimilation among immigrants from Africa.  
Using cross-sectional data from 1999 to 2009, Alcobendas and Rodriguez-Planas, 2009, 
analyze the occupational assimilation process after  the Spanish immigration boom, 
finding less optimistic results for the new waves of immigrants.  On the one hand, these 
authors find little sign of assimilation among non EU-15 female immigrants (especially 
those from Africa) and regardless of their educational level.  On the other, they find 
that, among non-EU-15 male immigrants, the degree of assimilation is higher the lower 
their education level, with the exception of African males who (again) have a harder 
time to assimilate.  Using the same data but from 1996 to 2005, Fernandez and Ortega, 
2008, also find that among immigrants, Africans are those faring worse in terms of 
returns to education, labor market assimilation, and higher sensitivity to the business 
cycle.  Similarly, Sanromá et al., 2009, find that immigrants coming from developing or 
culturally distant countries have lower average wages and show a relatively more 
compressed wage distribution than natives.  The authors suggest that occupational 
segregation is part of the story behind these wage differences.  Finally, using recently 
available panel data from Social Security records, Izquierdo et al., 2009, find that, 
despite a sizeable and significant reduction in the gap between legal immigrant men 
working in wage and salary jobs in the formal sector and their native counterparts 
within 5 years of arrival in Spain, full equality of wages does not take place as a 15   9
percentage points wage differential remains.  They also find that, on average, Africans 
fare the worse.  
 
III. Data and Descriptive Statistics 
We use a retrospective micro database that has been derived from the National 
Immigrant Survey (ENI-2007).  The National Immigrant survey (ENI-2007) was 
administered to approximately 15,500 non-native current residents of Spain between the 
months of November 2006 and February 2007.  All persons 16 years and older who 
were born abroad and who had been in Spain for at least one year were eligible to be 
interviewed.  For those who had been in Spain for less than a year, their intent to remain 
in the country for at least a year also qualified them for participation in the survey.  A 
resident is a person who is present in the country regardless of her legal status.  The 
Spanish Statistical Office designed the strategy for locating informants.  This task was 
based on the existence of the Municipal Register or Padrón Municipal.  A response rate 
with respect to the effective sample eligible respondents of 87.4 percent was obtained 
(15,465 interviews).  The results of this survey are statistically representative of Spain, 
for the main migrant origins and for the major regions of the country.  All results are 
weighted according to the sample frame set up by the Spanish Statistical Office. 
The survey includes information on socio-demographic characteristics of 
immigrants (including language skills, education, fertility, and marital status, among 
others), household structure, current place of residence, conditions upon departure from 
their country of origin and arrival in Spain, personal migration histories, and country of 
origin.  
In contrast with most of the literature that uses visa information, we have self-
reported information on the reason of arrival, namely arrival due to the presence of a   10
family member, or to work.  As the question in the ENI-2007 allowed for multiple 
answers, we defined family-based immigrant as those who reported leaving their 
country of origin to meet other family members already living in Spain (regardless of 
whether they also answered whether they came to work).  This is important because we 
are exploring assimilation differences based on whether they had a family member in 
Spain prior to arrival that they were joining.  Because some of our family-based 
migrants also reported coming to Spain to work, any differences in assimilation across 
the two groups will underestimate the differences across those who “only” came for 
family reasons versus those who “only” came to work.
3  Finally, it is important to 
highlight that almost two thirds of those who reported coming to work to Spain knew 
someone in the host country at arrival (shown in Table 1).  This information is relevant 
because it rules out that our study is identifying individuals with and without networks.  
In fact, we have detailed information on networks at arrival and at survey date, and we 
control for it in our regression analysis. 
Restricting our attention to those individuals who were born in Morocco who 
were between 19 and 55 years old and who provided information about their year of 
arrival leaves us with a dataset of 1,334 observations, of which 65.22% are males (870 
observations) and 34.78% (464 observations) are females.  The reason for restricting our 
attention to this age group is that we are particularly interested in whether reason of 
arrival affects employment assimilation.  Table 1 shows that a larger fraction of women 
(43.08% of women) than men (34.49% of men) arrived in Spain for family reasons.  
Table 1 also presents the summary statistics of migrants’ observable characteristics.  At 
survey date, family-based male Moroccans are older than work-based male Moroccans, 
while the opposite is true for female Moroccans.  The median Moroccan migrant in our 
                                                 
3 About 20% of those who reported coming for family reasons in our sample, also stated that they came to 
Spain to work.   11
sample arrived in the late 1990s. Family-based male Moroccans have been longer in the 
host country (about four years longer) than their work-based counterparts—but no 
difference in years since arrival is apparent among women.  The average age at arrival is 
the early twenties.  However, those who came for family reasons were, on average, 
about two years younger than those who arrived to work.   
As already mentioned, this population has low levels of education with close to 60% 
of them having primary education or less.  That said, those who came to work are more 
educated than those who came for family reasons. The likelihood of being married is 
higher for those women who came to work than for those who came for family reasons.  
And family-based migrants live in larger households than work-based ones. 
  There is evidence of self-selection among the family- and the work-based 
subgroups, as those who came to work are between twice (among women) and nearly 
five times (among men) more likely to have worked in Morocco prior to migrating.  
Thus, controlling for employment status prior to arriving in Spain will be of most 
importance to reduce endogeneity bias due to self-selection.   
  Not surprisingly, those who arrived in Spain for family reasons travel less to their 
country of origin.  Family-based women are less likely to participate in co-ethnic 
associations (but more likely to participate in Spanish associations) than their work-
based counterparts.  Among men, the main network difference is that those who arrived 
for family reasons are more likely to participate in co-ethnic associations.  
  Table 2 displays summary statistics of selected outcome variables by reason of 
arrival and sex.  We observe clear differences between Moroccans who came to work 
and those who came for family reasons, and these differences differ across sex.  Close 
to 90 percent of Moroccans living in Spain are legal residents.  However, those who 
came for family reasons are between 2 and 9 percentage points more likely to be legal   12
than those who arrived to work.  When looking at the likelihood of working at survey 
date, we observe that men are slightly more likely to work than women, and that work-
based migrants are about two-thirds more likely to work at survey date than family-
based migrants.  Among those who work, family-based males earn more than labor-
based ones.  The opposite is true for women.  Clearly these observed differences across 
family- and work-based immigrants are just descriptive, and given the compositional 
differences that we have observed in Table 1, multivariate regression analysis is needed 
to try to disentangle possible causal effects.  This is the main purpose of the rest of the 
paper. 
 
IV. Legal and Employment Assimilation 
This section analyzes the differences in legal and employment assimilation by reason of 
arrival.  Three types of outcomes are discussed: (1) legal status at survey date; (2) 
employment status at survey date; and (3) earnings at survey date.  Because the 
Southern Mediterranean region displays unique gender characteristics that imply 
important social, economic and cultural differences between men and women, the 
analysis is done separately for the two groups. 
Employment and Legal Assimilation 
Clearly the decision to work and the choice of legal status are heavily interrelated.  
Illegal migrants may find it more difficult to find a job or a job that matches their skills.  
As a consequence, many illegal migrants may decide not to work or not to accept 
certain types of jobs.  Conversely, because of their precarious situation, being illegal 
may lower migrants’ reservation wage and prompt them to accept any type of job.  At 
the same time, having a job (even one in the black market) has been one of the 
administrative requisites for obtaining legal status during the amnesties in Spain.   
Moreover, to maintain legal status, many migrants have to periodically show proof of   13
employment.  Because of this, we estimate a bivariate probit model in which the two 
LHS variables are dummies indicating whether the individual works and whether she 
has legal status at survey date. 
The model consists of two simultaneous equations, one for the binary decision to 
have legal status or not, Y1i, and another for the binary decision to work or not, Y2i.  Let 
the superscript 
* indicate an unobserved variable and assume that 
*
1i Y and 
*
2i Y  are as 
follows: 










1 ε α α α α α + + + + + =      (1) 
Y1i=1    if Y1i
*>0         
Y1i=0   otherwise 
 










2 ε α α α α α + + + + + =   (2) 
Y2i=1    if Y2i
*>0         
Y2i=0   otherwise     for i=1, 2, ….,N 
where Cov(ε1i, ε2i) 0.  In other words, the errors in each model consist of a part (ηi) that 
is unique to that model, and a second part (θi) that is common to both: 
     i i i θ η ε + = 1 1       (3)
 
i i i θ η ε + = 2 2  
The disturbances ji ε , j=1, 2 are assumed to be zero-mean, bivariate normal distributed 
with unit variances and a correlation coefficient ρ, where ρ is a “correlation parameter” 
denoting the extent to which the two  ji ε , j=1, 2, covary. 
Xji
1, j=1, 2, is a vector including a dummy variable set to 1 if the individual 
arrived in Spain for family reasons (and 0 if she arrived to Spain to work); Xji
2, j=1, 2,  
is a vector of cohort of arrival dummies (grouping intervals of 5 years); Xji
3, j=1, 2,  is a 
vector of covariates that include years since migration (YSM), its square, and both   14
variables interacted by reason of arrival; and Xji
4,  j=1, 2, represents a vector of 
covariates that include state of residence, age dummies, education dummies, marital 
status and household size, employment status in Morocco prior to emigrating, 
employment status at arrival, having co-ethnic and Spanish networks at arrival or at 
survey date, and being fluent in Spanish.  First, it is important to highlight the richness 
of our dataset, which contains employment information in the origin country, and at 
arrival, as well as information on networks.
4  Second, while we are not exploiting the 
panel structure of this dataset, we are controlling for their employment status at arrival.
5   
The coefficients and standard errors of key variables from models (1) and (2) are 
shown in Table 3 (Panel A for men and Panel B for women).  Columns (1) through (5) 
display different specifications in which we sequentially add different controls: (1) 
cohort of arrival and state dummies; (2) socio-demographic characteristics; (3) previous 
employment history (both in Morocco and at arrival to Spain); (4) network effects; and 
(5) Spanish fluency.  We can look at the coefficients and standard errors to gauge 
direction and statistical significance of individual variable effects, and to see how these 
change as additional covariates are added into the model.   
However, to analyze the effect of reason of arrival on employment and legal 
assimilation, we estimate predicted joint probabilities for four possible outcomes: 
Pr(Y1i=1, Y2i=1); Pr(Y1i=1, Y2i=0); Pr(Y1i=0, Y2i=1); and Pr(Y1i=0, Y2i=0) using the 
estimated coefficients from the bivariate probit model.  These predicted joint 
probabilities are calculated by reason of arrival and at different years since arrival for a 
representative individual type of each gender: a migrant living in Madrid, who arrived 
in the 1990s, aged 35 to 39 years old, fluent in Spanish, currently married, with only 
                                                 
4 The richness of our dataset contrast with that of other papers in this literature, such as Aydemir, 2011, or 
de Silva, 1997. 
5 We could construct a panel similar to the one in Aydemir, 2011, where we observe employment status at 
arrival and at survey date.  We decided not to do so in this paper because we want to be able to estimate 
simultaneously employment and legal assimilation.  Unfortunately, legal status at arrival is not observed.    15
primary education, living in a household with 4 members, working at origin, without a 
job at arrival and with no networks.  These predicted joint probabilities are graphed in 
Figure 1.  Below we summarize the main results. 
Focusing first on women migrants, we observe that most of them arrive in Spain 
with legal status.  The reason of arrival matters in terms of whether female migrants 
work or not when they first arrive in Spain.  At arrival, family-based female migrants 
are more likely to not work (58%) than to work (42%).  In contrast, work-based female 
migrants are more likely to work (77%) than to be non-employed (22%).  Over time, 
there is employment convergence by reason of arrival because the joint probability of 
working and having legal status increases with years since migration for those who 
arrived due to family reasons, but decreases for those who arrived to work.   
The story differs drastically for men for at least three reasons.  First, we find that 
Moroccan men are much more likely to arrive in Spain illegally than women.  While the 
likelihood of arriving in Spain illegally is practically non-existent among Moroccan 
women, the joint probability of being illegal and not working at arrival is close to one 
third among male migrants regardless of reason for arrival.  This joint likelihood drops 
to 10% within the first five years in the host country for both types of migrants.   
Perhaps not surprisingly, Figure 1 also shows that the joint probability of working and 
being illegal at arrival for labor-based male migrants (14%) is more than three times that 
of their family-based counterparts (4%).  Again, this joint probability converges towards 
0 within the first few years after arrival.   
Second, arriving in Spain to work is associated with a joint probability of both 
working and having legal status twice as large as that of family-based male migrants 
(24% versus 12%).  In contrast with the convergence observed among women, this 
employment advantage does not narrow over time.  For instance, after a decade in   16
Spain, work-based male migrants have a joint probability of working and having legal 
status of 55% compared to that of 26% for their family-based counterparts.  
Third, the male findings are consistent with the fact that the easiest way to 
become legal in Spain is through employment (as one of the main conditions in the 
amnesties is to have an employer guaranteeing a job).  We observe that migrants who 
arrived to work were less likely to be legal at arrival (53%) than their family-based 
counterparts (59%).  However, after a decade in Spain, they were equally likely of 
having legal status (96%). 
Summing up, we observe that once all observable characteristics are controlled 
for, family-based immigrants are less likely to work than their labor-based counterparts 
both at arrival and ten years later (and for each gender).  These results are consistent 
with those found in countries that select immigrants based on their skills.  For instance, 
Jasso and Rosenzweig, 1995, find that based on their occupations, skilled immigrants 
appear more favorably selected than immigrants entering as spouses of US citizens.  
Cobb-Clark, 2000, finds that immigrants selected for their skills have higher labor force 
participation and employment rates 6 months after arrival in Australia.  Constant and 
Zimmermann, 2005a, find that, in Germany, former refugees and those who arrive 
through family reunification are less likely to work full-time compared to those who 
came through the employment channel.  However, this contrasts with evidence 
indicating that reason of arrival does not play any significant role in terms of 
employment outcomes in Denmark (Constant and Zimmermann, 2005a), and in Canada 
(Aymenir, 2011).
6  Our findings are novel in that we are focusing on a very 
homogenous group of migrants (Moroccans) who tend to be low skilled.  We find that, 
even in this case and after controlling for migrants’ self-selection with employment 
                                                 
6 Aymenir, 2011, does find an labor force participation advantage for the skill-based (instead of the 
family-based) migrants, but only among women.  He finds no employment differences, though.    17
history prior to and at arrival, family ties are not as helpful in terms of securing 
employment.   
Another novel result is that we do not find evidence of steeper YSM profiles for 
family-based male migrants than their work-based counterparts.
7  This is particularly 
concerning as it suggest that family-based Moroccan males have a difficult time 
assimilating in the Spanish labor market, leaving them in a particularly vulnerable 
situation.   
To explore how language and employment history may affect legal and 
employment assimilation, Figures 2 and 3 graph predicted joint probabilities for a 
similar type as in Figure 1 but who does not have Spanish fluency (in Figure 2), or who 
did not work at origin (in Figure 3).  Interestingly, Figure 2 shows that language skills 
are extremely helpful in enabling women to work but do not make much of a difference 
for men.  Comparing Figures 1 and 2, in which the only differences across types is 
whether the individual is fluent in Spanish, reveals that language proficiency doubles 
the joint probability of both working and being legal for women (regardless of reason of 
arrival).  In contrast, language has little effect on Moroccan men’s joint probabilities of 
working and having legal status.  This differential result by gender is consistent with 
findings from Alcobendas and Rodríguez-Planas, 2009, that a language advantage exists 
and does not fade away among immigrant women in Spain but not among immigrant 
men.
8  This finding suggests that a policy to increase labor market assimilation among 
Moroccan women may come through language proficiency classes. 
Comparing Figures 1 and 3, in which the only differences across types is 
whether the individual worked at origin, shows that working at origin shifts up the joint 
                                                 
7 In contrast with our results, Chiswick and Miller, 1992; Wooden, 1990; and Cobb-Clark, 2000 find that 
the differences in legal and employment status eventually dissipate among males immigrants in Australia, 
which is well known by its point system. 
8 Alcobendas and Rodríguez-Planas, 2009, compare occupational assimilation in Spain between 
immigrants from Latin America who are fluent in Spanish and those from Eastern Europe.   18
probability of working and being legal in Spain for both types and regardless of gender, 
while it decreases the joint likelihood of not working and being legal.  However, 
whether the individual worked at origin has no effect on the joint likelihood of not 
working and being illegal.  This reveals that having a job prior to migrating is important 
in determining migrants’ employment success in the host country’s legal labor market.  
Moreover, this result supports policies based on the point system.
9 
Wage Assimilation 
When analyzing earnings, we use model (4) below with a log-linear specification and 
log earnings as the LHS variable.   








1 0    (4) 
where Xi
1 is a vector including a dummy variable set to 1 if the individual arrived in 
Spain for family reasons (and 0 if she arrived to Spain to work); Xi
2 is a vector of cohort 
of arrival dummies (grouping intervals of 5 years); Xi
3 is a vector of covariates that 
include years since migration (YSM), its square, and both variables interacted by reason 
of arrival; and Xi
4 represents a vector of covariates that include state of residence, age 
dummies, education dummies, marital status and household size, employment status in 
Morocco prior to emigrating, employment status at arrival, having co-ethnic and 
Spanish networks at arrival or at survey date, and being fluent in Spanish.   
In addition, to account for possible selection bias arising from not accounting for 
individual’s choice of whether to work or not, we use a Heckman selection bias 
correction.  To do this, we first estimate the probability of working at survey date for all 
individuals in the data set.  The probability that an individual worked is modeled as a 
function of age, the number of children and the age of the youngest child in the 
household, marital status, work experience, education, state of residence, tenant or 
                                                 
9 Countries using the point system “select” immigrants based on their skills.     19
house-ownership status, and living in a municipality with less than 5000 inhabitants. 
From this equation, we estimate the inverse Mills ratio, and use it as an additional 
independent variable in the earnings equation.  Our source of identification that appears 
in the selection equation but not the wage equation includes: having children, age of 
youngest child, tenant or house-ownership status, and living in a municipality with less 
than 5000 inhabitants.
10  We argue that correcting for the migrant’s employment 
decision is particularly relevant in this analysis because we have observed clear 
employment differences by reason of arrival.  Again, the analysis is done separately by 
gender.  Results are presented in Table 4.   
In terms of wages, OLS estimates indicate that family-based male migrants earn 
18 log points higher wages prior to adding controls in the model.  Adding controls to the 
OLS specification decreases the wage differential by two thirds.  However, the 
Heckman corrected estimates of the family-based dummy become negligible (0 log 
points) and are no longer statistically significant, suggesting that once the employment 
decision is accounted for, there are no wage differences by reason of arrival among 
men.  Similarly, while the OLS estimates indicated that the YSM profile is steeper for 
family-based male immigrants, this is no longer true after we have applied the Heckman 
correction.  Notice also that the negative coefficient on the YSM profile for labor-based 
is no longer statistically significant after the Heckman correction and all controls are 
applied to the estimation.  Similar results are found among women, indicating that any 
wage differences by reason of arrival are mainly due to labor force participation.  The 
main difference worth highlighting is that the OLS coefficient on the family-based 
                                                 
10 Finding good instruments is difficult.  Having children is a commonly used instrument, although it may 
be correlated with wages.  Alternatively our variable on tenant or ownership status is probably a better 
instrument.  Nonetheless, because of concerns with endogeneity of our instruments we estimated the OLS 
wage model including these variables as controls.  When doing so, most of the coefficients of interest 
remain unaffected.  The only coefficient that changes slightly is that of reason for migrating among males 
which drops from 0.05 (s.e. 0.011) to 0.039 (s.e. 0.011).     20
estimate among women is negative, indicating that prior to correcting for labor-force 
participation, family-based women earn less than their work-based counterparts. 
Our OLS estimates for women are consistent with those found in the literature, 
but the opposite is true for those of men.  For instance, de Silva, 1997, and Aydemir, 
2011, find that skilled immigrants in Canada have higher annual earnings than assisted 
relatives and refugees, but that the gap narrows overtime.  While this difference in the 
male results may come as a surprise it is important to remember that Canada has a point 
system that selects high-skilled migrants.  In contrast, our analysis focuses on a 
relatively low skill group of migrants, Moroccans, in a country that lets anyone in.   
In addition, Aydemir, 2011, finds that controlling for immigrants’ characteristics 
explains only a small portion of the earnings differential across types.  However, we 
find that among men, our controls explain two thirds of the wage gap by reason of 
arrival in the OLS regression.  Most importantly, our results show that no wage 
differences exist by reason of arrival after selection into employment is accounted for.  
This is particularly important at it is well established in the literature that employment 
differences by reason of arrival exist in many host countries.  Finally, finding that no 
wage differences by reason of arrival exist seems consistent with the fact that we are 
comparing a quite homogeneous group of migrant workers. 
 
IV.  Conclusion 
Over the second half of the 20th century, Morocco has evolved into one of the world's 
leading emigration countries, and Spain has become one of its preferred destinations. 
Understanding the labor market assimilation of Moroccan low–skilled (often irregular) 
migrants is of great policy relevance not only for economic, but also for social reasons.  
Exploiting the rich information from the 2007 Encuesta Nacional de Immigración   21
(ENI), which reports on labor market outcomes before and after arrival in the host 
country, we study the settlement process of Moroccan immigrants in Spain focusing on 
how the circumstances under which they entered the host country affected their legal 
and their employment status (including their earnings).  More specifically, our analysis 
studies whether immigrants who arrive on the basis of family relationships rather than 
labor market opportunities assimilate faster both in terms of becoming legal citizens and 
of actively participating in the labor market.   
  Policy wise, the results in this paper show that what happens to Moroccans who 
leave for Spain depends on why they migrated in the first place and on their gender.  
Moreover, we find evidence that Spanish proficiency facilitates women’s labor market 
assimilation but has no effect on men.  Finally, our analysis also shows that having 
worked prior to migrating further increases the immigrant’s labor market success in the 
host country.   
  A concern with our analysis is that we cannot correct for return migration.   
Indeed, the lack of employment convergence among men may be explained by higher 
return migration among the least successful work-based migrants as they lack family 
support in the host country.  Nevertheless, because the richness of the data enables us to 
control for important characteristics, such as migrant’s employment prior to migrating, 
we present estimates that are potentially less biased than those previously presented 
using cross-sectional data. 
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Table 1. Moroccans in Spain in 2007, by Reason for Arrival and Sex 
(Percent unless otherwise stated) 
   Family-based migrant  Labor-based migrant 
   Males  Females  Males  Females 
37.908  32.491  35.417  36.444  Current age (mean) 
(9.20)  (10.44)  (8.54)  (9.39) 
1996  1998  2000  1998  Year of arrival (median) 
(12.01)  (11.78)  (8.53)  (12.46) 
11.000  9.000  7.000  9.000  Year since arrival(median) 
(12.01)  (11.78)  (8.53)  (12.46) 
23.880  20.995  25.861  23.739  Age at arrival (mean) 
(10.37)  (9.82)  (7.95)  (9.75) 
0.563  0.575  0.576  0.473  Primary 
(0.5)  (0.49)  (0.49)  (0.5) 
0.241  0.202  0.109  0.136  HS dropouts 
(0.43)  (0.4)  (0.31)  (0.34) 
0.131  0.196  0.234  0.245  HS graduate 
(0.34)  (0.4)  (0.42)  (0.43) 
0.064  0.026  0.081  0.146  University degree 
(0.25)  (0.16)  (0.27)  (0.35) 
0.511  0.626  0.600  0.591  Spanish fluency 
(0.5)  (0.48)  (0.49)  (0.49) 
0.679  0.570  0.575  0.678  Married 
(0.47)  (0.50)  (0.49)  (0.47) 
0.623  0.568  0.351  0.593  Couple 
(0.48)  (0.50)  (0.48)  (0.49) 
4.734  5.011  3.840  3.607  Number of persons in household 
(2.23)  (2.53)  (2.15)  (1.51) 
0.125  0.205  0.594  0.431  Working in origin country 
(0.33)  (0.40)  (0.49)  (0.5) 
0.046  0.041  0.127  0.174  Had a job before leaving Morocco 
(0.21)  (0.2)  (0.33)  (0.38) 
0.179  0.250  0.353  0.318  Was working within 30 days after 
arrival to Spain 
(0.38)  (0.44)  (0.48)  (0.47) 
3.761  5.433  5.164  6.350  How many times have you visited the 
country since coming to Spain (mean) 
(4.93)  (6.47)  (5.8)  (6.86) 
0.066  0.048  0.050  0.073  Participates in co-ethnic associations 
(0.25)  (0.21)  (0.22)  (0.26) 
0.090  0.122  0.090  0.091  Participate in Spanish associations 
(0.29)  (0.33)  (0.29)  (0.29) 
Someone known in Spain at arrival  0.765  0.726  0.595  0.570 
   (0.43)  (0.45)  (0.49)  (0.5) 
Sample size  313  202  557  262 
Population size  34,346  20,761  65,229  27,421 
Note: All means have been weighted at the population level.  Standard deviations in parentheses. 
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Table 2. Moroccans in Spain in 2007, by Reason for Arrival and Sex 
Selected Outcome Variables 
   Family-based migrant  Labor-based migrant 
   Males  Females  Males  Females 
0.929  0.913  0.855  0.887  Currently legal resident 
(0.256)  (0.2814)  (0.352)  (0.317) 
0.417  0.390  0.714  0.630  Working last week 
(0.493)  (0.488)  (0.452)  (0.483) 
Monthly Wages   1,115.03  935.03  1,041.39  954.35 
   (602.733)  (401.749)  (368.672)  (570.597) 
Sample size  34,346  20,761  65,229  27,421 
Population size  313  202  557  262 
Note: All means have been weighted at the population level.  Standard deviations in parentheses.  
Source: National Immigrant Survey (ENI 2007)   28
Table 3.  Bivariate Probit Model. Moroccans 19 to 55 Years Old in Spain. 
   Panel A: Males  Panel B: Females 












characteristics  Employment  Networks 
Spanish 
fluent 
   Dependent variable: Legal status 
Family-based migrant  0.325***  0.097*  0.161***  0.205***  0.160***  -0.462***  -0.429***  -0.266***  -0.231***  -0.164*** 
   (0.048)  (0.052)  (0.053)  (0.053)  (0.054)  (0.043)  (0.048)  (0.050)  (0.050)  (0.050) 
Family-based migrant * Ysm  0.293***  0.308***  0.311***  0.316***  0.280***  -0.103***  -0.071***  -0.063***  -0.071***  -0.053*** 
   (0.007)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.012)  (0.012) 
Family-based migrant * Ysm
2  -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.009***  -0.008***  0.002***  0.002***  0.001***  0.002***  0.001*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ysm  -0.037***  -0.031***  -0.033***  -0.030***  -0.011  -0.462***  0.114***  0.092***  0.101***  0.084*** 
   (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.043)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010)  (0.010) 
Ysm
 2  0.002***  0.003***  0.002***  0.002***  0.002***  -0.103***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.002***  -0.001*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.010)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
   Dependent variable: Employment  status 
Family-based migrant  -0.991***  -0.977***  -0.646***  -0.656***  -0.656***  -1.591***  -1.357***  -1.052***  -1.048***  -1.045*** 
   (0.025)  (0.026)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.027)  (0.029)  (0.032)  (0.034)  (0.034)  (0.034) 
Family-based migrant * Ysm  -0.000  0.039***  0.053***  0.064***  0.064***  -0.043***  -0.042***  -0.043***  -0.052***  -0.051*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Family-based migrant * Ysm
 2  -0.000***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  0.000**  0.000***  0.000***  0.001***  0.001*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Ysm  -0.012***  -0.018***  -0.022***  -0.024***  -0.024***  0.121***  0.088***  0.076***  0.079***  0.078*** 
   (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.003)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.004) 
Ysm
 2  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  0.001***  -0.002***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.001*** 
   (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
Unweighted sample size  870     464    
Note:  All specifications include region dummies.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1    29
 
 
Figure 1. Predicted Probabilities from Bivariate Probit Model for a Spanish Fluent Low Skilled Worker Who Worked at Origin   30
 
 
Figure 2. Predicted Probabilities from Bivariate Probit Model for a not Proficient in Spanish Low Skilled Worker Who Worked at 
Origin   31
 
 
Figure 3: Predicted Probabilities from Bivariate Probit Model for a Spanish Fluent Low Skilled Worker Who Did Not Work at 
Origin   32 
Table 4.  Log Wage Estimation.  Moroccans 19 to 55 Years Old in Spain. 
 
                            
      Men  Women 
      OLS  Heckman corrected  OLS  Heckman corrected 
     
No other 
covariates  All controls  No other 
covariates  All controls  No other 
covariates  All controls  No other 
covariates  All controls 
Family-based migrant  0.183***  0.050***  0.026  0.001  -0.235***  -0.297***  -0.000  0.004 
   (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.111)  (0.109)  (0.016)  (0.016)  (0.176)  (0.168) 
Family-based migrant * ysm  0.012***  0.015***  0.013  0.016  0.021***  0.029***  0.025  0.021 
      (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.011)  (0.011)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.022)  (0.020) 
   Family-based migrant * ysm_sq  -0.000***  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000  -0.000***  -0.000  -0.000 
      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
   Ysm  -0.032***  -0.016***  -0.021*  -0.014  0.033***  0.036***  -0.013  -0.012 
      (0.001)  (0.001)  (0.012)  (0.012)  (0.002)  (0.002)  (0.022)  (0.021) 
Ysm_sq  0.001***  0.000***  0.000**  0.000  -0.001***  -0.001***  -0.000  0.000 
      (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000)  (0.000) 
   Unweighted sample size  859  458 
   Goodness of fit 
1  0.128  0.307  79.42  147.2 0.135 0.322 49.22  119.2 
Note:  1 Adjusted R squared in OLS and Chi Square in Heckman corrected specification.   
All specifications include region dummies.  *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1  
 
 
 
 
 
 